Department of the Army
Fort McClellan, Alabama
Category: Training Schools
Mission: Fort McClellan is home to the U.S. Army Chemical School, U.S. Army Military Police School, and the DoD Polygraph Institute, and the site of the nations only Chemical Defense Training Facility
One-time Cost: $231.0 million
Savings: 1996-2001: $-109.5 million (Cost)
Annual: $40.6 million
Return on Investment: 2005 (6 years)
FINAL ACTION: Close
Secretary of Defense Recommendation
Close Fort McClellan, except minimum essential land and facilities for a Reserve Component enclave and minimum essential facilities, as necessary, to provide auxiliary support to the chemical demilitarization operation at Anniston Army Depot. Relocate the U. S. Army Chemical and Military Police Schools to Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, upon receipt of the required permits. Relocate the Defense Polygraph Institute (DODPI) to Fort Jackson, South Carolina. License Pelham Range and current Guard facilities to the Alabama Army National Guard.
Secretary of Defense Justification
This closure recommendation is based upon the assumption that requisite permits can be granted to allow operation of the Chemical Defense Training Facility at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. The Governor of the State of Missouri has indicated that an expeditious review of the permit application can be accomplished.
Collocation allows the Army to focus on the doctrinal and force development requirements of Engineers, Military Police, and the Chemical Corps. The synergistic advantages of training and development programs are: coordination, employment, and removal of obstacles; conduct of river crossing operations; operations in rear areas or along main supply routes; and counter-drug operations. The missions of the three branches will be more effectively integrated.
This recommendation differs from the Army's prior closure recommendations submitted to the 1991 and 1993 Commissions. The Army will relocate the Chemical Defense Training Facility (CDTF) to Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. By relocating the CDTF, the Army can continue providing live-agent training to all levels of command. The Army is the only Service that conducts live agent training, and it will continue this training at Fort Leonard Wood.
The Army has considered the use of some Fort McClellan assets for support of the chemical demilitarization mission at Anniston Army Depot. The Army will use the best available assets to provide the necessary support to Anniston's demilitarization mission.
Community Concerns
The Fort McClellan community believes that DoD failed to comply with the 1993 Commissions direction to pursue permits prior to recommendation. They further argue the issued permits may be invalid, and obtaining a hazardous waste permit may delay completion of a Chemical Defense Training Facility (CDTF) at Fort Leonard Wood beyond 6 years. The community estimates the cost of a new CDTF at up to $70 million, and the cost of environmental remediation of the existing site at $50 million. The community claims that building a new CDTF risks the loss of live-agent chemical training should environmental suits at Fort Leonard Wood prevail following closure of Fort McClellan. The recommended move, the community argues, also risks turbulence in chemical and military police training at a time when those specialties have been identified as particularly essential to the services missions. The community also sees a risk in reducing the Chemical School to a department of a larger school, costing the Chemical School the influence and prominence needed to carry out its national and international role. The Fort McClellan community claims that environmental restrictions on smoke training at Fort Leonard Wood would imperil the training mission. The community notes the economic impact of this proposal was the highest for any Army closure, and the National Guard enclave and environmental cleanup sites would leave little of the post available for community reuse.
Commission Findings
The Commission found the Department of the Army complied to the extent possible with the 1993 Commissions directive to pursue all necessary environmental permits before resubmitting a recommendation to close Fort McClellan. Accordingly, the Army prepared the applications and submitted them concurrently with the recommendation on March 1, 1995.
The Commission found determining the validity of individual state-issued permits was beyond the Commissions charter; other avenues of appeal exist to determine their validity. The Commission concurred, however, with the finding that a hazardous waste permit, under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, was not required for operation of the Chemical Defense Training Facility, as evidenced by the successful operation of the Fort McClellan CDTF without such a permit, and information supplied by the Army to the State of Missouri. The Commission found that all permits issued by the State of Missouri conformed to the Army's requests. The Commission further found permits, once issued, were vested as property rights of Fort Leonard Wood, making revocation difficult. The Commission found the Army's projected construction cost of a new CDTF to be reasonable.
With regard to the support provided by the Army to the chemical demilitarization operation at Anniston Army Depot, the Commission found the Army accounted for the costs of such support, but did not specify the assets to be used. The Commission further found the Army's commitment was to supply particular capabilities, independent of where those capabilities were stationed.
The economic impact on the Anniston, Alabama area was found to be significant.
Minimizing turbulence when moving the Chemical School to Fort Leonard Wood was found to be a challenge to Army management. To ensure the capability for live-agent training was maintained, however, the Commission revised the DoD recommendation to require that the Fort McClellan CDTF not be closed until a similar facility was operational at Fort Leonard Wood.
Commission Recommendation
The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criteria 1 and 2. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close Fort McClellan, except minimum essential land and facilities for a Reserve Component enclave, minimum essential facilities, as necessary, to provide auxiliary support to the chemical demilitarization operation at Anniston Army Depot, Alabama and the Chemical Defense Training Facility (CDTF). The CDTF will operate at Fort McClellan until such time as the capability to operate a replacement at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri is achieved. Relocate the U.S. Army Military Police School and the U.S. Army Chemical School to Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. Relocate the Defense Polygraph Institute (DODPI) to Fort Jackson, South Carolina. License Pelham Range and current Guard facilities to the Alabama Army National Guard. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.
Fort Greely, Alaska
Category: Major Training Areas
Mission: Provide administrative and logistical support to the Northern Warfare Training Center and the Cold Regions Test Activity; assist military organizations and units in their training
One-time Cost: $23.1 million
Savings: 1996-2001: $38.7 million
Annual: $17.9 million
Return on Investment: 1999 (1 year)
FINAL ACTION: Realign
Secretary of Defense Recommendation
Realign Fort Greely by relocating the Cold Region Test Activity (CRTA) and Northern Warfare Training Center (NWTC) to Fort Wainwright, Alaska.
Secretary of Defense Justification
Fort Greely currently supports two tenant activities (CRTA and NWTC) and manages training areas for maneuver and range firing. Over 662,000 acres of range and training areas are used by both the Army and the Air Force. These valuable training lands will be retained.
The Army has recently reduced the NWTC by over half its original size and transferred oversight responsibilities to the U.S. Army, Pacific. The garrison staff will reduce in size and continue to support the important testing and training missions. The Army intends to use Fort Wainwright as the base of operations (107 miles away) for these activities, and "safari" them to Fort Greely, as necessary. This allows the Army to reduce its presence at Fort Greely, reduce excess capacity and perform essential missions at a much lower cost. The Army intends to retain facilities at Bolio Lake (for CRTA), Black Rapids (for NWTC), Allen Army Airfield, and minimal necessary garrison facilities to maintain the installation for contingency missions.
Community Concerns
Residents of the Delta Junction community have expressed strong opposition to the DoD recommendation based upon Fort Greelys military value as a major training area, its unique location in the Cold Triangle, which facilitates almost year-round testing by the Cold Regions Test Activity, and the severe economic impact that the area would suffer upon realignment. Community leaders and citizens emphasized that with no other economic base, the recommendation could have a devastating impact on the area, and diminish the size of the local school population by half.
Commission Findings
The Commission found the Army plans to continue its actual Arctic testing and Arctic training activities at Fort Greely. Fort Greely is in the most suitable location, the North American Cold Triangle, to conduct Arctic activities. The Commission found the realignment to Fort Wainwright of those personnel and functions not required to support the Cold Regions Test Activity and the Northern Warfare Training Center at Fort Greely is operationally sound and will generate significant savings.
The Commission also found increased base operating efficiencies would occur if the headquarters and support elements for the Cold Regions Test Activity and Northern Warfare Training Center move to Fort Wainwright. The Commission found that personnel can travel to Fort Greelys Bolio Lake and Black Rapids training facilities to perform their mission, when NWTC courses or CRTA testing is required. While the Commission found the economic impact on Delta Junction, Alaska and its local school system will be serious, these factors were outweighed by both the military value and significant savings that will result from implementation of the Secretary's Recommendation. To lessen the economic impact and to facilitate community planning for the future, the Commission further found the execution phase of the recommendation should not begin earlier than July 1997, the latest date permitted by Public Law 101-510 to begin a move, and should not be completed before July 2001, the latest date permitted to complete a move. The Army is encouraged to ensure that buildings and facilities at Fort Greely which do become nonessential as a result of the realignment shall be maintained in good working condition to maximize future reuse possibilities.
Commission Recommendation
The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criteria 1, 4, and 5. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: realign Fort Greely by relocating the Cold Regions Test Activity (CRTA) and the Northern Warfare Training Center (NWTC) to Fort Wainwright, Alaska, but begin the move no earlier than July 1997. The move should not be completed earlier than July 2001. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.
Fort Chaffee, Arkansas
Category: Major Training Areas
Mission: Support active Army and Reserve Component training
One-time Cost: $9.6 million
Savings: 1996-2001: $38.2 million
Annual: $13.4 million
Return on Investment: 1999 (1 year)
FINAL ACTION: Close
Secretary of Defense Recommendation
Close Fort Chaffee, except minimum essential buildings, and ranges for Reserve Component (RC) training as an enclave.
Secretary of Defense Justification
In the past ten years, the Army has significantly reduced its active and reserve forces. The Army must reduce excess infrastructure to meet future requirements.
Fort Chaffee is the former home of the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC). In 1991, the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission approved the JRTC's relocation to Fort Polk, LA. The transfer was completed in 1992. The post is managed by an Active Component/civilian staff, although it possesses virtually no Active Component tenants.
Fort Chaffee ranked last in military value when compared to other major training area installations. The Army will retain some ranges for use by the RC units stationed in the area. Annual training for Reserve Component units which now use Fort Chaffee can be conducted at other installations in the region, including Fort Polk, Fort Riley and Fort Sill. The Army intends to license required land and facilities to the Army National Guard.
Community Concerns
The community believes that the military value was improperly assessed, dropping from fifth of ten in 1993, to last among the same ten installations in 1995. The Arkansas Army and Air National Guard are concerned about the future use of both maneuver acreage and the Razorback Range aerial bombing and strafing course, and wish to retain the ranges and most of the maneuver areas. They contend that stopping Reserve Component annual training at Fort Chaffee, and traveling out of state, will cause the quality of training and readiness to suffer severely. Additionally, they believe the increased costs and time required to travel greater distances will result in no significant overall savings. The community further argued DoD should not close Fort Chaffee so that current tenant activities could remain. Finally, concern was expressed that employer support for the Reserve Components may dwindle if additional time away from work is required by employees to get to and from more distant training locations.
Commission Findings
The Commission found the Army evaluated all its major training area installations equally. The Commission also found the Army's process of integrating a quantitative installation assessment with a qualitative operational blueprint, based upon operational and stationing requirements of the Army Stationing Strategy, is a sound approach to develop a military value assessment (MVA) for each installation in this category.
The Commission carefully considered the change in Fort Chaffee's military value assessment from 1993 to 1995, validating the ranking that resulted from changes in the attributes and weights, and found them equally applied to all installations in this category. The Commission found the Army's original recommendation, which omitted any reference to training land remaining in the enclave, was a legitimate concern of the National Guard and other Reserve Component units, as it decreased their ability to meet training requirements. Therefore, the Commission found the remaining enclave, after closure, must contain sufficient maneuver and artillery training areas to meet the needs of the Guard and Reserve. Because of potential problems with increased travel times to more distant installations, the Commission found the National Guard and other RC units must have access to the training area for both individual and annual training purposes.
Commission Recommendation
The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria 1 and 2. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close Fort Chaffee, except minimum essential ranges, facilities, and training areas as a Reserve Component training enclave to permit the conduct of individual and annual training. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.
Branch U.S. Disciplinary Barracks, Lompoc, California
Category: Minor Installation
Mission: Currently has no military mission
One-time Cost: None
Savings: 1996-2001: None
Annual: None
Return on Investment: 1996 (Immediate)
FINAL ACTION: Close
Secretary of Defense Recommendation
Close Branch U.S. Disciplinary Barracks (USDB), Lompoc, CA.
Secretary of Defense Justification
Branch USDB, Lompoc consists of approximately 4,000 acres and 812,000 square feet of detention facilities. It is permitted to and operated by the Federal Bureau of Prisons. There are no Army activities on USDB, Lompoc. Accordingly, it is excess to the Army's requirements.
Community Concerns
There were no formal expressions from the community.
Commission Findings
The Commission found no reason to disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense.
Commission Recommendation
The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close Branch U.S. Disciplinary Barracks (USDB), Lompoc, California.
East Fort Baker, California
Category: Minor Installation
Mission: Provides facilities and housing
One-time Cost: $11.9 million
Savings: 1996-2001: $-7.6 million (Cost)
Annual: $1.3 million
Return on Investment: 2009 (11 years)
FINAL ACTION: Close
Secretary of Defense Recommendation
Close East Fort Baker. Relocate all tenants to other installations that meet mission requirements. Return all real property to the Golden Gate National Recreation Area.
Secretary of Defense Justification
East Fort Baker is at the north end of the Golden Gate Bridge in Marin County, CA. The post consists of approximately 347 acres and 390,000 square feet of facilities. It provides facilities and housing for the Headquarters, 91st Training Division (U.S. Army Reserve) and the 6th Recruiting Brigade, Army Recruiting Command. The 91st Training Division has a requirement to remain in the San Francisco Bay area, while the 6th Recruiting Brigade has a regional mission associated with the western United States. Both the 6th Recruiting Brigade and the 91st Training Division can easily relocate to other installations. The 91st Training Division will relocate to Parks Reserve Forces Training Area, where it better aligns with its training mission. Closing East Fort Baker saves operations and support costs by consolidating tenants to other military installations without major construction.
Community Concerns
There were no formal expressions from the community.
Commission Findings
The Commission found no reason to disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense.
Commission Recommendation
The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close East Fort Baker. Relocate all tenants to other installations that meet mission requirements. Return all real property to the Golden Gate National Recreation Area.
Fort Hunter Liggett, California
Category: Major Training Areas
Mission: Home of the Test and Experimentation Command Experimentation Center and the major maneuver training area for the California Army National Guard and western United States Army Reserve forces
One-time Cost: $6.7 million
Savings: 1996-2001: $12.5 million
Annual: $5.7 million
Return on Investment: 1999 (1 year)
FINAL ACTION: Realign
Secretary of Defense Recommendation
Realign Fort Hunter Liggett by relocating the U.S. Army Test and Experimentation Center (TEC) missions and functions to Fort Bliss, Texas. Eliminate the Active Component mission. Retain minimum essential facilities and training area as an enclave to support the Reserve Components (RC).
Secretary of Defense Justification
Fort Hunter Liggett is low in military value compared to other major training area installations and has few Active Component tenants. Relocation of the Test and Experimentation Center optimizes the unique test capabilities afforded by Fort Bliss and White Sands Missile Range.
Fort Hunter Liggett's maneuver space is key to Reserve Component training requirements. Since it is a primary maneuver area for mechanized units in the western United States, retention of its unique training lands is essential.
Community Concerns
Local and state officials are concerned with the cumulative economic impact of previous base closure and realignment actions, coupled with recent major fires and floods in this sparsely populated area. Residents do not want the Test and Experimentation Commands Experimentation Center to move to Fort Bliss, Texas. They maintain that Fort Hunter Liggett, with its varied terrain, a natural bowl surrounded by hills, which permits non-eye-safe laser testing, low artificial light, and no radio frequency interference, is the premier location for operational testing. They believe that possible frequency interference, arid desert conditions, and proximity to the large city of El Paso, make Fort Bliss undesirable as a test site. Some believe Fort Hunter Liggett should have been evaluated as a proving ground or an operational test facility, instead of as a major training area. The California Army National Guard is keenly interested in training at the installation and retaining access to ranges and training areas.
Commission Findings
The Commission found the Army properly evaluated Fort Hunter Ligget as a major training area and found no basis to change the installations category. The realignment of this installation ends the Active Component presence while preserving the U. S. Army Reserve Command garrison. The Army will license the training facilities and training area to the California National Guard as part of the realignment.
The Commission examined the community's claim that Fort Hunter Ligget is ideal for TEC's location and found them to be accurate. The community believed relocation of TEC to Fort Bliss would be unwise, unworkable, and too expensive. The Commission examined each issue raised by advocates of keeping TEC in California and found non-eye-safe laser testing within a 360-degree area is not required for most tests, the frequency conflict between White Sands Missile Range and TEC telemetry can be resolved by coordination of future tests, and the Army has plans to digitize required areas of Fort Bliss. The Commission found although Fort Hunter Ligget is suited to its current mission, the mission can be relocated to Fort Bliss without disruption, and the Army will achieve substantial savings as a result.
Commission Recommendation
The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: realign Fort Hunter Liggett by relocating the U.S. Army Test and Experimentation Center (TEC) missions and functions to Fort Bliss, Texas. Eliminate the Active Component mission. Retain minimum essential facilities and training area as an enclave to support the Reserve Components (RC).
Oakland Army Base, California
Category: Ports
Mission: Manage movement of DoD cargo throughout the western US and Pacific; manage port operations on the West Coast and at Pacific locations
One-time Cost: $36.5 million
Savings: 1996-2001: $22.9 million
Annual: $15.9 million
Return on Investment: 2000 (2 years)
FINAL ACTION: Close
Secretary of Defense Recommendation
None. The Commission added this military installation to the list of bases to be considered by the Commission for closure or realignment as a proposed change to the list of recommendations submitted by the Secretary of Defense.
Community Concerns
The community argues Oakland Army Base provides a critical capability during any major regional contingency. Without Oakland, significant combat forces deploying from Continental United States (CONUS) will not arrive in time to meet the theater commanders required delivery dates. Further, Oakland can efficiently ship overweight, oversized, and non-container military cargo that commercial ports have difficulty handling. The community contends Oakland's availability on short notice and its secure operating environment offer vital flexibility to military planners. Commercial facilities are becoming increasingly unwilling to guarantee staging and berthing space, within 48 hours, to military cargo. Because commercial facilities are operating near capacity, they are hesitant to disrupt normal traffic, fearing damage to customer relationships and their long term profitability.
Commission Findings
The Commission found the normal workload of Oakland Army Base does not justify its continued operation as a military terminal. Oakland's role in a west region contingency is based on transportation feasibility analysis that models an obsolete force structure and stationing plan. To date, DoD has not conducted analysis of Oakland's requirements from a ten division Army viewpoint. The Commission observed DoD transportation engineers list six commercial ports on the West Coast capable of deploying a mechanized infantry division. Further, the Commission acknowledged at least two other military ports on the West Coast handled military cargo in support of Desert Storm. The Commission addressed the growing resistance by commercial operators to disrupt commercial traffic to give priority to military needs. They noted the Maritime Administration (MARAD), Port Authorities, and DoD were undertaking two initiatives to address the issue. The Commission recognized legal means exist under the National Shipping Authority Service Priority Orders to obtain priority for military cargo in contingency situations. Based on deliberations, the Commission found the Secretary of Defense had deviated substantially from operational blueprint criteria by not recommending closure of Oakland Army Base.
Commission Recommendation
The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criterion 1. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close Oakland Army Base, California. Relocate Military Traffic Management Command - Western Area and 1302nd Major Port Command to locations to be determined. Enclave Army Reserve elements. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.
Rio Vista Army Reserve Center, California
Category: Minor Installation
Mission: Formerly supported an Army Reserve watercraft unit
One-time Cost: None
Savings: 1996-2001: $0.6 million
Annual: $0.1 million
Return on Investment: 1996 (Immediate)
FINAL ACTION: Close
Secretary of Defense Recommendation
Close Rio Vista Army Reserve Center.
Secretary of Defense Justification
Rio Vista Army Reserve Center consists of approximately 28 acres. It formerly supported an Army Reserve watercraft unit. Since Reserve Components no longer use Rio Vista Reserve Center, it is excess to the Army's requirements. Closing Rio Vista will save base operations and maintenance funds and provide reuse opportunities for approximately 28 acres.
Community Concerns
There were no formal expressions from the community.
Commission Findings
The Commission found no reason to disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense.
Commission Recommendation
The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close Rio Vista Army Reserve Center.
Sierra Army Depot, California
Category: Ammunition Storage Installations
Mission: Receive, store, maintain, issue, demilitarize, and calibrate special weapons, conventional ammunition, and general supplies; store Southwest Asia Petroleum Distribution Operational Project and Water Support Equipment Project for the Army
One-time Cost: $10.0 million
Savings: 1996-2001: $40.8 million
Annual: $18.5 million
Return on Investment: 1998 (Immediate)
FINAL ACTION: Realign
Secretary of Defense Recommendation
Realign Sierra Army Depot by eliminating the conventional ammunition mission and reducing it to a depot activity. Retain an enclave for the Operational Project Stock mission and the static storage of ores.
Secretary of Defense Justification
This recommendation is supported by the Army's long range operational assessment. The Army has adopted a "tiered" ammunition depot concept to reduce infrastructure, eliminate static non-required ammunition stocks, decrease manpower requirements, increase efficiencies and permit the Army to manage a smaller stockpile. The tiered depot concept reduces the number of active storage sites and makes efficiencies possible:
(1) Tier 1 - Active Core Depots. These installations will support a normal/full-up activity level with a stockage configuration of primarily required stocks and minimal non-required stocks requiring demilitarization. Normal activity includes daily receipts/issues of training stocks, storage of war reserve stocks required in contingency operations and additional war reserve stocks to augment lower level tier installation power projection capabilities. Installations at this activity level will receive requisite levels of storage support, surveillance, inventory, maintenance and demilitarization.
(2) Tier 2 - Cadre Depots. These installations normally will perform static storage of follow-on war reserve requirements. Daily activity will be minimal for receipts/issues. Workload will focus on maintenance, surveillance, inventory and demilitarization operations. These installations will have minimal staffs unless a contingency arises.
(3) Tier 3 - Caretaker Depots. Installations designated as Tier 3 will have minimal staffs and store stocks no longer required until demilitarized or relocated. The Army plans to eliminate stocks at these sites no later than year 2001. Sierra Army Depot is a Tier 3 Depot.
Complete closure is not possible, since Sierra is the Center of Technical Excellence for Operational Project Stocks. This mission entails the management, processing and maintenance of: Force Provider (550-man tent city), Inland Petroleum Distribution System; and Water Support System. It also stores such stocks as Clam Shelters (mobile maintenance tents), bridging, and landing mats for helicopters. The cost of relocating the Operational Project Stocks is prohibitively expensive. Therefore, the Army will retain minimum essential facilities for storage.
Community Concerns
The community argues the Army military value assessment undervalues or overlooks Sierras demilitarization mission. They point out Sierra has over 40 percent of the Army's open detonation capability, without which Army demilitarization goals cannot be met. The community notes conflicts between the Army's goals expressed in the Wholesale Ammunition Stockpile Program and criteria weighting factors in the military value analysis have not been resolved, and inclusion of the ammunition tiering plan in the operational blueprint short-circuits the military value analysis process. They contend due to a data error, the recommendation would cut only 125 direct positions, not 305, and reduce expected savings. Savings would also be reduced by the $38 to $91 million dollar cost of moving ammunition, and by having to ship ammunition in wartime from installations farther from west coast ports. The community contends Sierra received no credit for its almost complete ammunition surveillance facility or its missile maintenance and test facilities, and was undercounted by 88 percent in demilitarization capability. It also states the depots desert location, with dry outdoor storage, was scored the same as less-desirable locations. In addition, the community states the 839 jobs projected to be lost would constitute an 8.8 percent increase in county unemployment, resulting in total unemployment of 20.7 percent.
Commission Findings
The Commission found conventional ammunition demilitarization, one of Sierras principal missions, was undervalued, as no measure of demilitarization capacity was included in the installation assessment. While the operational blueprint considered long-term demilitarization capacity, the recommendations effect on near- to mid-term capacity was not considered. The Commission also found the recommendation conflicted with the Army operational blueprint by overcommitting demilitarization capacity. In addition, the Commission found the ammunition tiering plan should not have been used for BRAC purposes, as it prevented installations in the category from being fairly compared against each other, did not use certified data, and had several other flaws.
The Commission found the Secretary of Defenses alternative recommendation preserved essential demilitarization capacity and necessary covered and outdoor storage, reduced the original recommendations significant economic impact, and avoided substantial ammunition moving costs.
Commission Recommendation
The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criterion 1. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: realign Sierra Army Depot by reducing the conventional ammunition mission to the level necessary to support the conventional ammunition demilitarization mission. Retain a conventional ammunition demilitarization capability and an enclave for the Operational Project Stocks mission and the static storage of ores. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.
Fitzsimons Army Medical Center, Colorado
Category: Medical Centers
Mission: Provide medical services, train providers, and perform medical research
One-time Cost: $105.3 million
Savings: 1996-2001: $4.6 million
Annual: $36.4 million
Return on Investment: 2002 (2 years)
FINAL ACTION: Close
Secretary of Defense Recommendation
Close Fitzsimons Army Medical Center (FAMC), except for Edgar J. McWhethy Army Reserve Center. Relocate the Medical Equipment and Optical School and Optical Fabrication Laboratory to Fort Sam Houston, TX. Relocate Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS) activities to Denver leased space. Relocate other tenants to other installations.
Secretary of Defense Justification
FAMC is low in military value compared to other medical centers. This recommendation avoids anticipated need for estimated $245 million construction to replace FAMC while preserving health care services through other more cost-effective means. This action will offset any loss of medical services through: phased-in CHAMPUS and Managed Care Support contracts; increased services at Fort Carson and U.S. Air Force Academy; and redistribution of Medical Center patient load from Region Eight to other Medical
Centers. FAMC is not collocated with a sizable active component population. Its elimination does not jeopardize the Army's capability to surge to support two near-simultaneous major regional contingencies, or limit the Army's capability to provide wartime medical support in the theater of operations. Closure of this medical center allows redistribution of medical military personnel to other medical centers to absorb the diverted medical center patient load. These realignments avoid a significant cost of continuing to operate and maintain facilities at this stand-alone medical center. DoD's Joint Cross-Service Group for Military Treatment Facilities supports the closure of Fitzsimons.
Community Concerns
The community argues the installation assessment criteria employed by the Army to measure Fitzsimons Army Medical Center were inappropriate and it was unfair to limit the comparison to only the three stand-alone Army medical centers. In particular, the community points to the use of size as a comparative measure in several criteria, saying larger hospitals do not necessarily mean better or more efficient hospitals. They also observe the Army assessment criteria differed significantly from the criteria measured by the Medical Joint Cross Service Group. In addition, the community points out what they considered to be many inconsistencies and mistakes in the Army's scoring.
The community also argues closure of the hospital would have substantial negative impacts on the health and financial security of the large retired community in the Denver area. They say closing the hospital would break the promise of free health care for life that many feel was made to military retirees. They note the medical centers mission as a regional referral center for a 14-state region and the lack of any other tertiary care hospitals in the region. Further, the community questions the readiness impact of closing the medical center and eliminating the civilian personnel positions, as well as the readiness impact of losing its satellite communications capability.
The community also argues the economic impact on the City of Aurora would be extremely high. They say the area has already been badly hurt by previous base closures, and closure of Fitzsimons Army Medical Center would mean more direct and indirect job losses than reported by the Army. Finally, they question the one-time costs in the Army's analysis, the increased cost of transporting referral patients to other hospitals if the medical center closes, and the impact of the closure on DoD-Indian Health Service sharing agreements.
Commission Findings
The Commission found the Army's recommendation to close Fitzsimons Army Medical Center is in line with the Army's stationing strategy that military hospitals should primarily support active duty military personnel and their families. Fitzsimons does not primarily support a nearby active duty population, and its closure permits the Army to redirect medical personnel and resources to other hospitals that do. The Commission also found the medical centers referral mission can be economically absorbed by other facilities. The Commission agreed with the community that closure of Fitzsimons will create disruptions and raise costs for retirees seeking health care, but noted other government programs -- CHAMPUS, Tricare, Medicare, and continued pharmacy benefits -- will help to mitigate these impacts. The Commission found DoD's evaluation of joint service training consolidation alternatives could result in a decision to relocate tenants elsewhere; hence, it agreed to the request of the Secretary of Defense to not specify gaining locations.
Commission Recommendation
The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria 2 and 4. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close Fitzsimons Army Medical Center (FAMC), except Edgar J. McWhethy Army Reserve Center. Relocate other tenants to other installations. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.
Stratford Army Engine Plant, Connecticut
Category: Industrial Facilities
Mission: Engine production
One-time Cost: $6.6 million
Savings: 1996-2001: $20.5 million
Annual: $6.1 million
Return on Investment: 1998 (1 year)
FINAL ACTION: Close
Secretary of Defense Recommendation
Close Stratford Army Engine Plant.
Secretary of Defense Justification
The Stratford facility has produced engines for heavy armor vehicles and rotary wing aircraft. Reduced production requirements and the Army's increased capability for rebuild and repair have eliminated the need for the Stratford Army Engine Plant. There is no requirement for use of the installation by either the Active or Reserve Components.
The Army has an extensive capability to repair engines at Anniston and Corpus Christi Army Depots. The current inventory for these engines meets projected operational requirements. During mobilization, the capability to rebuild engines can be increased at both depots. In the event of an extended national emergency that would deplete stocks, the depots could reconfigure to assemble new engines from parts provided by the manufacturer until mothballed facilities become operational. Prior to closing the facility, the contractor will complete all existing contracts.
Community Concerns
The community contends closing Stratford Army Engine Plant will result in loss of the Army's only capability to produce turbine engines for tanks. The loss of this capability and the associated technical and engineering support, in the community's view, will have significant readiness impact. Another concern is the loss of 1600 contractor jobs from the local economy. The community claims a study, under Corps of Engineers direction, requires $17 million in environmental stabilization costs to close Stratford Army Engine Plant. The community questions whether or not the Army's recommendation complies with a Defense Science Board Tank Engine Industrial Base Task Force recommendation. The community challenges the Army's economic impact estimates and cost analysis. The community contends the Army is under estimating costs for equipment movement or disposal, military construction at gaining installations, and personnel. They also point out the Army analysis does not account for loss of $2 million in rental income from the contractor.
Commission Findings
The Commission found the Army can sustain the tank engine and helicopter turbine engine base through Anniston Army Depot, Alabama, and Corpus Christi Army Depot, Texas. With the decreasing need for new engines and technological capabilities currently available in the private industrial sector, retention of Stratford Army Engine Plant was not necessary. The Commission found the Army estimates on the costs of this recommendation were understated. Recognition of the costs associated with movement of Defense Contract Management Personnel and movement of equipment necessary to future production of spares for engine rebuild changed the return on investment to one year instead of immediate.
Commission Recommendation
The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close Stratford Army Engine Plant.
Big Coppett Key, Florida
Category: Minor Installation
Mission: Formerly provided communication support to the U.S. Army
One-time Cost: None
Savings: 1996-2001: $0.05 million
Annual: $0.01 million
Return on Investment: 1996 (Immediate)
Final Action: Close
Secretary of Defense Recommendation
Close Big Coppett Key.
Secretary of Defense Justification
Big Coppett Key, an island near Key West, consists of approximately five acres and 3,000 square feet of facilities. Big Coppett Key formerly provided communications support to United States Army. Since the Army no longer uses Big Coppett Key, it is excess and to Army requirements. Closing Big Coppett Key will save base operations and maintenance funds and provide reuse opportunities.
Community Concerns
There were no formal expressions from the community.
Commission Findings
The Commission found no reason to disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense.
Commission Recommendation
The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close Big Coppett Key.
Price Support Center, Illinois
Category: Command, Control and Administration
Mission: Administrative and logistics support
One-time Cost: None
Savings: 1996-01: None
Annual: None
Return on Investment: None
FINAL ACTION: Remain open
Secretary of Defense Recommendation
Close Charles Melvin Price Support Center, except a small reserve enclave and a storage area.
Secretary of Defense Justification
Charles Melvin Price Support Center provides area support and military housing to the Army and other Federal activities in the St. Louis, MO, area. It is low in military value compared to similar installations. Its tenants, including a recruiting company and a criminal investigative unit, can easily relocate.
This recommendation is related to the Army's recommendation to relocate Aviation-Troop Command (ATCOM) from St. Louis, MO, to other locations. A reduction in the Army's presence in the area warrants a corresponding reduction in Charles Melvin Price Support Center.
Community Concerns
The community believes the military value was understated because it did not adequately consider logistical value of the Price Support Center. The Army Center provides most of its support to other DoD organizations, and only limited support to the Aviation-Troop Command. The community argued the Army's savings were overstated because housing allowance costs were not considered, and closure costs were understated because the Army did not include costs to relocate the various DoD tenants. Finally, the community believes adequate housing is not available in the local market.
Commission Findings
The Commission found the Army did not include housing allowances for all personnel remaining in the St. Louis area. The Commission analysis shows the Army will save only $77,000 annually by paying housing allowances rather than operating and maintaining the family housing at Price Support Center. The Commission found the housing has no deferred maintenance, primarily because 100 of the 164 units were built during 1988/90 time frame. In addition, the Commission noted 257 personnel are already in off-base housing that is deemed unacceptable due to cost and distance from their work location. The Commission found the tenant activities do not have to be relocated, since the enclave includes all the warehouse and storage space. Finally, the Commission found the relocation of the Aviation-Troop Command has minimal effect on the Price Support Center.
Commission Recommendation
The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criteria 1 and 4. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: Charles Melvin Price Support Center will remain open. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.
Savanna Army Depot Activity, Illinois
Category: Ammunition Storage Installations
Mission: Receive, store, and issue conventional ammunition and critical strategic material; Technical Center for Explosives Safety; U.S. Army Defense Ammunition Center and School
One-time Cost: $66.6 million
Savings: 1996-2001: $-41.6 million (Cost)
Annual: $12.1 million
Return on Investment: 2006 (5 years)
FINAL ACTION: Close
Secretary of Defense Recommendation
Close Savanna Army Depot Activity (ADA). Relocate the United States Army Defense Ammunition Center and School (USADACS) to McAlester Army Ammunition Plant, Oklahoma.
Secretary of Defense Justification
This recommendation is supported by the Army's long range operational assessment. The Army has adopted a tiered ammunition depot concept to reduce infrastructure, eliminate static non-required ammunition stocks, decrease manpower requirements, increase efficiencies and permit the Army to manage a smaller stockpile. The tiered depot concept reduces the number of active storage sites and makes efficiencies possible:
(1) Tier 1 - Active Core Depots. These installations will support a normal/full-up activity level with a stockage configuration of primarily required stocks and minimal non-required stocks requiring demilitarization. Normal activity includes daily receipts/issues of training stocks, storage of war reserve stocks required in contingency operations and additional war reserve stocks to augment lower level tier installation power projection capabilities. Installations at this activity level will receive requisite levels of storage support, surveillance, inventory, maintenance and demilitarization.
(2) Tier 2 - Cadre Depots. These installations normally will perform static storage of follow-on war reserve requirements. Daily activity will be minimal for receipts/issues. Workload will focus on maintenance, surveillance, inventory and demilitarization operations. These installations will have minimal staffs unless a contingency arises.
(3) Tier 3 - Caretaker Depots. Installations designated as Tier 3 will have minimal staffs and store stocks no longer required until demilitarized or relocated. The Army plans to eliminate its stocks at these sites no later than year 2001. Savanna Army Depot Activity is a Tier 3 depot.
USADACS performs the following basic functions: munitions training, logistics engineering, explosive safety, demilitarization research and development, technical assistance, and career management. Relocation of USADACS to McAlester Army Ammunition Plant (AAP) allows it to collocate with an active ammunition storage and production operation. McAlester AAP, a Tier 1 depot, is the best for providing the needed capabilities.
Community Concerns
The community claims an Army study concluded all indoor Army ammunition storage would be full in Fiscal Year 95, arguing no such facilities can be closed. In addition, they argue costs of moving ammunition and personnel, as well as building a new facility to house the United States Army Defense Ammunition Center and School (USADACS) are understated. The Savanna community also alleges facilities identified to house USADACS at McAlester Army Ammunition Plant, Oklahoma, are inadequate. The community contends the explosive waste incinerator and depleted uranium demilitarization facilities on site at Savanna are essential to achieving Army demilitarization goals. Local officials note the unemployment resulting from a closure would reach 10.6 percent in Carroll and Jo Daviess counties, and increased unemployment would have extra impact on their rural area. They project $14 million in extra costs due to DoD's obligation to buy unsold homes, given the poor local real estate market. The community also notes reuse of Savanna would be inhibited by buried ammunition from its years as an artillery range.
Commission Findings
The Commission found facilities at McAlester Army Ammunition Plant will be adequate to house USADACS when construction is complete, and the community's estimate of $50 million in facilities costs was not documented. The economic impact in Carroll and Jo Daviess Counties was judged to be significant.
The Commission found the ammunition tiering plan used as an input to the Army's operational blueprint was not intended for BRAC purposes, and contained both internal inconsistencies and flaws arising from its use in the BRAC context. Because of the inclusion of the tiering plan, bases in different tiers could not be fairly evaluated against each other. DoD's estimated cost of moving residual ammunition was at the low end of the cost range established by Industrial Operations Command. Also, the Commission agreed with the Department that it was more economical to store depleted uranium munitions than to demilitarize them.
The Commission found no significant excess capacity existed in the Army ammunition storage system. The Commission, however, also found retention of the demilitarization capability at Sierra Army Depot left enough demilitarization capacity to create excess storage capacity equal to two installations over the next six years if demilitarization of existing ammunition stored outdoors is deferred. Given that ability, the Commission ultimately decided Savanna could be closed.
Commission Recommendation
The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close Savanna Army Depot Activity (ADA). Relocate the United States Army Defense Ammunition Center and School (USADACS) to McAlester Army Ammunition Plant, Oklahoma.
Concepts Analysis Agency, Maryland
Category: Leases
Mission: Independent studies
One-time Cost: $2.7 million
Savings: 1996-01: $0.1 million
Annual: $0.9 million
Return on Investment: 2002 (4 years)
FINAL ACTION: Close
Secretary of Defense Recommendation
Close by relocating Concepts Analysis Agency to Fort Belvoir, VA.
Secretary of Defense Justification
In 1993, the Commission suggested that DoD direct the Services to include a separate category for leased facilities to ensure a bottom-up review of leased space. The Army has conducted a review of activities in leased space to identify opportunities for relocation onto military installations. Because of the cost of leasing, the Army's goal is to minimize leased space when feasible, and maximize the use of government-owned space.
Since Army studies indicate that space is available at Fort Belvoir, the Concepts Analysis Agency can easily relocate with limited renovation. The annual cost of the current lease is $1.5 million.
Community Concerns
There were no formal expressions from the community.
Commission Findings
The Commission found no reason to disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense.
Commission Recommendation
The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close by relocating Concepts Analysis Agency to Fort Belvoir, Virginia.
Fort Holabird, Maryland
Category: Miscellaneous
Mission: Provide support to tenant activities
One-time Cost: *
Savings: 1996-2001: *
Annual: *
Return on Investment: *
FINAL ACTION: Close
* Costs and savings for this recommendation are included in the Defense Investigative Service recommendation.
Secretary of Defense Recommendation
None. The Commission added this military installation to the list of bases to be considered by the Commission for closure or realignment as a proposed change to the list of recommendations submitted by the Secretary of Defense.
Community Concerns
The Community supports closure of Fort Holabird after the relocation of the last remaining tenant the Investigation Control & Automation Directorate of the Defense Investigative Service.
Commission Findings
The Commission found Fort Holabird to be excess to the needs of the Army.
Commission Recommendation
The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criterion 1. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close Fort Holabird. Relocate the Defense Investigative Service (DIS), Investigations Control and Automation Directorate (IC&AD) to Fort Meade, Maryland. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.
Fort Meade, Maryland
Category: Command and Control
Mission: Provide base operations support to the National Security Agency and other tenants
One-time Cost: $1.6 million
Savings: 1996-2001: $16.4 million
Annual: $3.5 million
Return on Investment: 1997 (1 year)
FINAL ACTION: Realign
Secretary of Defense Recommendation
Realign Fort Meade by reducing Kimbrough Army Community Hospital to a clinic. Eliminate inpatient services.
Secretary of Defense Justification
This recommendation, suggested by the Joint Cross-Service Group on Medical Treatment, eliminates excess medical treatment capacity at Fort Meade, MD by eliminating inpatient services at Kimbrough Army Community Hospital. Inpatient care would be provided by other military medical activities and private facilities through Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS).
Community Concerns
The community contends the net effect of the Army's recommendation would be increased costs, not savings. They argue current hospital inpatient workload would go to CHAMPUS at rates higher than the Army estimates, and the cost of workload moving to Walter Reed Army Medical Center would be higher than the cost of the same workload at Kimbrough Army Community Hospital. The community also believes there could be negative impacts on the 57 tenant activities on Fort Meade and the 778 Fort Meade families enrolled in the Exceptional Family Member Program. Finally, the community contends there would be negative cost and access implications for current hospital users, especially retirees.
Commission Findings
The Commission found realignment of Kimbrough Army Community Hospital, to an outpatient clinic, will reduce costs by eliminating excess acute care hospital beds in an area with a number of other military hospitals. The Commission recognized current hospital users will have to travel to Walter Reed Army Medical Center or to civilian hospitals in order to receive needed inpatient services. While the Commission found this recommendation will save the government money, the Commission acknowledges the inconvenience some current Kimbrough users, particularly families enrolled in the Exceptional Family Member Program and some members of the retired community, will experience.
Commission Recommendation
The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: realign Fort Meade by reducing Kimbrough Army Community Hospital to a clinic. Eliminate inpatient services.
Fort Ritchie, Maryland
Category: Command and Control
Mission: Provides base operations and real property maintenance for the garrison installation, the National Military Command Center Facility Site R, satellite activities, and other tenants (including Camp David)
One-time Cost: $69.9 million
Savings: 1996-2001: $23.3 million
Annual: $26.1 million
Return on Investment: 1999 (2 years)
FINAL ACTION: Close
Secretary of Defense Recommendation
Close Fort Ritchie. Relocate the 1111th Signal Battalion and 1108th Signal Brigade to Fort Detrick, MD. Relocate Information Systems Engineering Command elements to Fort Huachuca, AZ.
Secretary of Defense Justification
This recommendation assumes that base support for Defense Intelligence Agency and other National Military Command Center support elements will be provided by nearby Fort Detrick. Closing Fort Ritchie and transferring support elements of the National Military Command Center to Fort Detrick will: (a) maintain operational mission support to geographically unique Sites R and C (National Military Command Center) for the Joint Chiefs of Staff; (b) capitalize on existing facilities at Site R and C to minimize construction; (c) maintain an active use and continuous surveillance of Site R and Site C facilities to maintain readiness; (d) collocate signal units that were previously separated at two different garrisons; (e) consolidate major portion of Information Systems Engineering Command-CONUS with main headquarters of Information Systems Engineering Command to improve synergy of information system operations; and (f) provide a direct support East Coast Information Systems Engineering Command field element to respond to regional requirements. These relocations, collocations and consolidations allow the elimination of Fort Ritchie's garrison and avoids significant costs associated with the continued operation and maintenance of support facilities at a small installation.
Community Concerns
The community argues Fort Ritchie provides vital joint service support of high military value within the National Capital Region. As such, the installation met the Army's operational blueprint for a critical facility and should have been excluded from closure consideration. In the community's view, Fort Ritchie provides critical support to the Alternate Joint Command and Control Site R. Relocation of that support to Fort Detrick, Maryland, would unacceptably degrade emergency response time to Site R. The community maintains the DoD recommendation to close Fort Ritchie misses an opportunity to achieve synergy by not consolidating disparate Defense Information Systems Agency - Western Hemisphere (DISA-WESTHEM) elements at Fort Ritchie. They also note the primary customer base for numerous tenants is located in the National Capital Region (NCR). Relocation of those tenants to Fort Huachuca, AZ, would result in increased operating costs not captured in the DoD cost estimates. The community further contends existing water shortages at Fort Huachuca will be exacerbated by relocating elements from Fort Ritchie.
The community argues that initial Army cost estimates were fatally flawed. Personnel strength figures and family housing operations were erroneous, and cost estimates failed to consider the requirement for continued on-site garrison activities at Site R. From the community's perspective, the flawed estimates invalidate the foundation of the closure recommendation. The community also notes the impact of closing Fort Ritchie will be a severe economic blow to the surrounding Northern Maryland / Southern Pennsylvania area where the unemployment rate is consistently greater than state and national averages.
Commission Findings
The Commission found support to the Alternate National Military Command Center (Site R) is a vital requirement, and that response time from Fort Detrick, Maryland, is 45 minutes or more longer than from Fort Ritchie. The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, accepts the lengthened response time, and thus the Commission found this recommendation does not adversely impact operation of Site R.
The Commission noted the Defense Information Systems Agency - Western Hemisphere (DISA-WESTHEM) performs valuable oversight of Defense Department automated management database links. The Commission found DISA-WESTHEM's mission is not location dependent. It can be accomplished anywhere appropriate communication nodes exist.
Commission Recommendation
The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criteria 1 and 4. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close Fort Ritchie except for a National Guard enclave. Relocate the 1111th Signal Battalion and 1108th Signal Brigade to Fort Detrick, Maryland. Relocate Information Systems Engineering Command elements to Fort Huachuca, Arizona. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.
Publications Distribution Center Baltimore, Maryland
Category: Minor Installation
Mission: Publications distribution
One-time Cost: $7.0 million
Savings: 1996-2001: $27.3 million
Annual: $7.7 million
Return on Investment: 1998 (Immediate)
Final Action: Close
Secretary of Defense Recommendation
Close by relocating the U.S. Army Publications Distribution Center, Baltimore to the U.S. Army Publications Center St. Louis, Missouri.
Secretary of Defense Justification
Consolidation of the U.S. Army Publications Distribution Center, Baltimore with the U.S. Army Publications Center, St. Louis, combines the wholesale and retail distribution functions of publication distribution into one location. The consolidation eliminates a manual operation at Baltimore in favor of an automated facility at St. Louis and creates efficiencies in the overall distribution process. This move consolidates two leases into one less costly lease.
Community Concerns
The community expressed concern that greater savings would be achieved by consolidating all of the DoD Publications Centers into the Baltimore and St. Louis Centers. They argue because both are DoD's most sophisticated publications centers, the lesser, more manual facilities throughout DoD should be consolidated into the two best. The community expressed concern the Baltimore Center was classified as a manual operation when in fact it is a highly automated facility. Despite the fact that forklift operators are still required to store and retrieve stock, the rest of the facility is highly automated. The community expressed concern if the Baltimore Center closed, the St. Louis Center would be required to lease additional warehouse space in St. Louis because they do not possess the space required to absorb Baltimore's stock.
Commission Findings
The Commission found although the Department of Defense is currently studying the consolidation of all DoD publication distribution centers, no such consolidation is expected to involve the Publications Distribution Center, Baltimore. The Commission found Publications Distribution Center, Baltimore is an automated facility despite the Secretary of the Army's assertion that it is a manual facility. Additionally, the Commission found the Army will be using warehouse space on an Army-owned installation during the transition period involving the consolidation of the two Army publications distributions centers.
Commission Recommendation
The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close by relocating the U.S. Army Publications Distribution Center, Baltimore to the U.S. Army Publications Center St. Louis, Missouri.
Tri-Service Project Reliance
(Fort Detrick, Maryland)
Category: Commodity
Mission: Provide facilities and services to tenant activities
One-time Cost: $0.3 million
Savings: 1996-2001: $4.5 million
Annual: $0.03 million
Return on Investment: 1996 (Immediate)
FINAL ACTION: Redirect
Secretary of Defense Recommendation
Change the recommendation of the 1991 Commission regarding Tri-Service Project Reliance. Upon disestablishment of the U.S. Army Biomedical Research Development Laboratory (USABRDL) at Fort Detrick, MD, do not collocate environmental and occupational toxicology research with the Armstrong Laboratory at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH. Instead relocate the health advisories environmental fate research and military criteria research functions of the Environmental Quality Research Branch to the U.S. Army Environmental Hygiene Agency (AEHA), Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, and maintain the remaining functions of conducting non-mammalian toxicity assessment models and on-site biomonitoring research of the Research Methods Branch at Fort Detrick as part of Headquarters, U.S. Army Medical Research and Materiel Command.
Secretary of Defense Justification
There are no operational advantages that accrue by relocating this activity to Wright-Patterson AFB. Substantial resources were expended over the last 15 years to develop this unique laboratory currently used by researchers from across the DoD, other federal agencies, and the academic community. No facilities are available at Wright-Patterson to accommodate this unique aquatic research activity, which supports environmental quality R&D initiatives developing cost effective alternatives to the use of mammalian species in toxicity testing. The Commission found necessary significant new construction would be required at Wright-Patterson to duplicate facilities at Fort Detrick to continue this critical research. No construction is required at Aberdeen Proving Ground, however. Furthermore, the quality of water required for the culture of aquatic animals used in this research is not adequate at Wright-Patterson. The Commission found to maintain the water quality it would necessitate additional construction and result in either several years of costly overlapping research in Maryland and Ohio, or the loss of over 10 years experience with the unique lab colonies used at Fort Detrick. The Navy and the Air Force agree that true research synergy is possible without executing the planned relocation.
Community Concerns
There were no formal expressions from the community.
Commission Findings
The Commission found this recommendation would permit DoD to avoid the cost and disruption of relocating a unique facility without compromising the cross-servicing goals of the Tri-Service Project Reliance Study. Therefore, the Commission found this recommendation does not deviate from the 1991 Commissions intention to consolidate biomedical research functions.
Commission Recommendation
The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: change the recommendation of the 1991 Commission regarding Tri-Service Project Reliance. Upon disestablishment of the U.S. Army Biomedical Research Development Laboratory (USABRDL) at Fort Detrick, Maryland, do not collocate environmental and occupational toxicology research with the Armstrong Laboratory at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio. Instead relocate the health advisories environmental fate research and military criteria research functions of the Environmental Quality Research Branch to the U.S. Army Environmental Hygiene Agency (AEHA), Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, and maintain the remaining functions of conducting non-mammalian toxicity assessment models and on-site biomonitoring research of the Research Methods Branch at Fort Detrick as part of Headquarters, U.S. Army Medical Research and Materiel Command.
Hingham Cohasset, Massachusetts
Category: Minor Installation
Mission: Currently has no mission
One-time Cost: None
Savings: 1996-2001: $0.8 million
Annual: $0.2 million
Return on Investment: 1996 (Immediate)
FINAL ACTION: Close
Secretary of Defense Recommendation
Close Hingham Cohasset.
Secretary of Defense Justification
Hingham Cohasset, formerly a U.S. Army Reserve Center, is essentially vacant and is excess to the Army's requirements. The site consists of approximately 125 acres and 150,000 square feet of facilities. Closing Hingham Cohasset will save base operations and maintenance funds and provide reuse opportunities.
Community Concerns
There were no formal expressions from the community.
Commission Findings
The Commission found no reason to disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense.
Commission Recommendation
The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close Hingham Cohasset.
Sudbury Training Annex, Massachusetts
Category: Minor Installation
Mission: Provide storage facilities for various DoD activities
One-time Cost: $0.8 million
Savings: 1996-2001: $-0.1 million (Cost)
Annual: $0.1 million
Return on Investment: 2003 (5 years)
FINAL ACTION: Close
Secretary of Defense Recommendation
Close Sudbury Training Annex.
Secretary of Defense Justification
Sudbury Training Annex, outside Boston, consists of approximately 2,000 acres and 200,000 square feet of facilities. The primary mission of Sudbury Training Annex is to provide storage facilities for various Department of Defense activities. Sudbury Training Annex is excess to the Army's requirements. Closing the annex will save base operations and maintenance funds and provide reu |
